Over the past 35 years, beginning with Cognitive Experiential Self Theory (CEST) (Epstein 1973) , a series of dual process models have been introduced that describe two qualitatively different systems of thinking. In addition to the experiential and rational systems of CEST (Epstein 1973; 1983; 1985; 1994 , these theories include "rule-based vs.
associative" (Sloman 1996; Smith and DeCoster 2000) ; "System 1 vs. System 2" West 1998, 2000; Kahneman and Frederick 2002, Kahneman 2003) ; "reflective vs impulsive" (Strack and Deutsch 2004) ; and "deliberative/ analytic vs. tacit/intuittive" (Hogarth 2005) 1 . A key commonality among modern dual process theories is the existence of two qualitatively different and interoperating systems, each best suited to its own purpose.
While any number of modern dual-process theories could be used to motivate studying situational and individual differences in thinking styles, we ground our work in CEST for several reasons. First, we note that CEST predates other modern dual-process theories, with its foundations presented in Epstein (1973) , and with several recently introduced dual-process theories bearing very close resemblance to CEST (e.g. Sloman 1996; Smith and DeCoster 2000) . Second, as summarized in Table 1 , CEST provides the richest conceptual descriptions and understanding of two qualitatively different thinking styles, thus providing greater guidance for item development. By assimilating all of the attributes of equivalents of the experiential system found in other dual-process theories, CEST provides a meaningful substitute for what is generically referred to as "System 1" and "System 2" (e.g. Kahneman, 2003; Stanovich and West 2000) . Third, as a global theory of personality as well as a dual processing theory, CEST has a unique focus on individual differences, with well established scales that measure general dispositional tendencies to adopt rational and experiential thinking styles (Epstein et al. 1996; Pacini and Epstein 1999; Epstein 2003a, 2003b) . Incorporating dispositional tendencies allows us to understand how trait and state thinking style processes jointly influence task performance and related outcomes of situational influences.
---insert table 1 about here ---CEST posits that humans simultaneously employ dual, and qualitatively different, experiential and rational processing systems, or "thinking styles." Key assumptions of CEST are that neither the experiential or rational system is generally superior, and the two systems operate both simultaneously and sequentially. The key operating characteristics of CEST, summarized in Table 1 , are derived from Epstein, Denes-Raj and Heier (1996) and Epstein (2003) . As noted, this well articulated set of operating characteristics is a key distinction between CEST and other dual-process theories; other dual process theories do not describe the characteristics of component dual process systems in as much depth as does CEST (for detailed discussion of CEST and other dual-process theories, see Chaiken and Trope 1999) .
A second point of distinction between CEST and other dual process theories is that CEST identifies the experiential system in a meaningful way as an adaptive automatic learning system with roots in evolution. The operating characteristics of the experiential system in CEST are consistent with and can be derived from the operation of an automatic, non-verbal learning system. The rational, inferential reasoning system, on the other hand, is uniquely human (Epstein 1994) . Associative connections in the nonverbal, rapid, imagistic, affect-laden and holistic experiential system are automatically learned by experience through classical conditioning, instrumental conditioning, and imitation learning; the verbal, effortful, abstract, affect-free and analytic rational system learns through logical inference (e.g., Epstein 1994 Epstein , 2003 Epstein , 2005 . A third major difference is that the experiential and rational systems are embedded in a global theory of personality. Thus, the two systems can and have been validated by measuring personality variables that are not applicable to more narrowly conceived dual-process theories (e.g. Epstein et al. 1996; Pacini and Epstein 1999; Epstein 2003a, 2003b ).
Thinking style is often primed or experimentally manipulated, but is rarely directly measured in the context of a given situation. We define situation broadly to incorporate different tasks or activities that consumers may undertake, as well as different motivations or orientations that consumers may bring to a specific task or activity. In this context, we measure situationspecific thinking style (SSTS) , which is the particular thinking style or momentary thinking orientation adopted by a consumer in a specific situation, as contrasted with a general dispositional tendency to favor a particular thinking style. Theoretically, SSTS may be influenced by the task itself, or by the consumer's underlying motive for performing a given task, independent of the task.
We develop new two-dimensional scales to reliably measure situation-specific thinking style, and demonstrate the validity of these scales by showing that the rational or experiential nature of a task, as well at the motivation for performing a task, influence situation-specific thinking style. Our scales thus have an immediate application for consumer behavior researchers as manipulation checks for priming tasks or experimental manipulations intended to induce a particular thinking style.
Additionally, we address the question of which system (experiential or rational) is superior under what conditions. Hammond (1996) produces an illuminating discussion of this issue. He proposes a general rule that to optimally solve a problem the kind of processing used should match the kind of problem. Higgins (2000) similarly raises the question, "what makes a decision good?" and notes that the fit of the means by which an outcome was obtained with the situation contributes to superior performance and perception of value from fit. In our research, we use SSTS to systematically test the outcomes of fit between the demands of a task and the thinking style adopted when performing the task. Our findings contribute to the literature on fit and congruence effects involving thinking styles, and argue for situation-specific thinking style being routinely measured as a process variable when considering performance on a wide range of consumer activities.
While we focus on clearly defined experimental tasks, our conceptualization of situational differences in thinking style is broad enough to include everyday activities that consumers engage in. For example, the fit of thinking style with activity would be expected to impact outcomes for work vs. play (Babin, Darden and Griffin 1994; Hammond, McWilliam and Diaz 1998; Wolfinbarger and Gilly 2001) , directed vs. nondirected search (Bloch Sherrell and Ridgway 1986) , choice among specific alternatives vs. navigational choice (Hoffman and Novak 1996; Deci and Ryan 1985) , and planned purchases vs. impulse buys (Rook 1987) .
We further propose that dispositional thinking style, an enduring predisposition toward predominantly rational or experiential thinking, plays a key role in determining the thinking style employed in a given situation. Dispositional tendencies create heterogeneity in how different individuals approach the same task, contributing to congruence or incongruence of SSTS with the task. Thus, SSTS provides an important mediating link between a broad, dispositional crosssituational thinking style, and performance on tasks that are congruent or incongruent with a thinking style
The five studies presented here contribute to theory linking a) situations as elicitors of thinking style, b) dispositional tendencies to adopt a thinking style, and c) thinking styles employed by consumers in practice. Our research also has practical implications for empirical consumer behavior researchers employing dispositional and situation-specific thinking style as manipulation checks, process measures, explanatory variables, or covariates.
HYPOTHESES
Measurement. Considerable research has established that different thinking styles are better suited for different tasks or activities (e.g. Epstein 1994 and Hammond et al 1987; Hammond 1996; Hogarth 2005; Kahneman and Frederick 2002; Kahneman 2003 ). Hogarth (2005 , in discussing Hammond (1996) , notes that "tasks can also be arranged on a continuum that reflects the extent to which they are likely to induce intuitive thought, at one extreme, to analytic thought, at the other." Additionally, the nature of the task has been found to influence the degree to which a rational or experiential thinking style is adopted (e.g. Epstein, Donovan and Denes-Raj 1999; Isen, Daubman and Nowicki 1987; Schwartz and Bless 1991) . For example, Hammond et al. (1987) specify a set of 11 task properties that "induce a corresponding package of cognitive properties" of either intuition (experiential) or analysis (rational). These 11 task properties include features such as number of cues (many induces experiential, few induces rational), availability of an organizing principle (unavailable induces experiential, available induces rational), and display of cues (simultaneous induces experiential, sequential induces rational).
If some situations are better suited to a particular thinking style, then it naturally makes sense to measure thinking style in the context of specific situations. However, Hogarth (2005) notes this is rarely done, since "few investigators provide any kinds of controls over whether people respond to problems in tacit [experiential] While tasks or activities can be characterized as primarily rational or experiential, CEST assumes that consumer responses will be based upon both information processing systems.
Rational and experiential thinking are separate constructs. Empirical evidence has found the two underlying constructs of rationality and experientially are independent, when measured as dispositional variables (e.g. Epstein et al. 1996; Pacini and Epstein 1999; Epstein 2003a, 2003b) . Thus, we propose that:
H1: Rational and experiential SSTS will be better fit by a two-dimensional factor structure than by a one-dimensional factor structure.
Fit of Task and Thinking
Style. In the context of regulatory focus theory, the value of a good fit between task demands and processing style has been clearly established (Higgins 2000; Higgins et al. 2003) , and it has been noted that "there is also evidence from other research programs that the fit effect is not restricted to regulatory focus variables" (Higgins et. al 2003 (Higgins et. al , p. 1150 . Some fit effects have been reported regarding thinking style and tasks, although none of these studies have employed self-report measures of thinking style. Hogarth (2005) notes that "people's judgments will tend to be more valid when there is a match between properties of the task and the mode of thought employed," citing empirical evidence provided by Hammond et al. (1987) . While fit between task and mode of thought appear to improve performance, lack of fit has been found to degrade performance (Hammond et al. 1987; Hogarth 2005; McMacklin and Slovic 2000; Schooler, Ohlsson and Brooks 1993; Schooler and Engstler-Schooler 1990) . For example, verbalization induces rational thinking and has a negative impact on the ability to solve problems that require insightful solutions , even when the respondent is an expert (Fallshore and Schooler 1995; Wilson and Schooler 1991; Wilson et al. 1993) .
Similarly, Cacioppo, Priester and Berntson (1993) H2: SSTS that is congruent (incongruent) with the experiential or rational nature of a task will correlate positively (negatively) with objective measures of task performance.
H3: SSTS that is congruent (incongruent) with the experiential or rational nature of a task will be positively (negatively) associated with subjective measures of i) decreased perceived workload, ii) increased perceived performance and iii) decreased perceived task difficulty.
Mediation of Disposition in Performance Prediction. The Rational-Experiential Inventory
(REI) is a measure of dispositional thinking style that has been in continuous development since 1996 (Epstein et al. 1996; Pacini and Epstein 1999; Epstein 2003a, 2003b In any given situation, task performance can be influenced be a person's dispositional thinking style (e.g. REI), and the situation-specific thinking style adopted in that situation.
Dispositional thinking style will also influence SSTS. Will the prediction of task performance from dispositional thinking style be fully or only partially mediated by SSTS? If partially mediated, there would be two paths for the influence of dispositional thinking style, a mediated path through SSTS and a direct path. The direct path will indicate the degree to which participants were unable to report the entire influence of their SSTS, some of which may be unconscious. On the other hand, if completely mediated, this suggests that people can accurately report their SSTS, and there is no residual influence of dispositional thinking style on performance. Note that hypothesis four is worded in a manner that keeps open as an empirical matter the degree of mediation, and whether the degree of mediation may be different for experiential and rational processing.
H4:
The prediction of rational (experiential) task performance from rational (experiential) dispositional thinking style will be mediated by rational (experiential) SSTS.
Our first three studies investigate the above hypotheses. Studies 1 and 2 develop and cross-validate two original scales measuring the new constructs of experiential and rational situation-specific thinking style (SSTS), and test hypotheses 1 and 2. Study 3 also includes measures of dispositional thinking style, and is used to test hypotheses 2, 3 and 4.
The preceding hypotheses are framed in terms of different types of tasks. As we view SSTS in a broader situational context, we introduce two additional hypotheses involving different motives for performing the same task. The first three studies provide an internal validation of the SSTS, since if the degree of experiential (rational) processing improves performance on an experiential (rational) task, then this is also a confirmation that the task itself was experiential (rational) in nature. Hypotheses 5 and 6, in turn, focus on the external, nomological validity of the SSTS -do the scales correlate with constructs to which, theoretically, they should be related?
Consummatory vs. Instrumental Motives. Over 50 years ago, Alderson (1957) contrasted consummatory and instrumental motives: "Consummatory motives underlie consumption behaviors that are intrinsically rewarding … whereas instrumental motives underlie consumption behaviors that are seldom rewarding in themselves and are undertaken to achieve some other goals" (Pham 1998) . This is similar to the distinction made in the communications literature between ritualistic and instrumental orientations to media (Rubin; Rubin and Perse 1987), and to the classification of expected benefits in the marketing literature into hedonic/experiential and utilitarian benefits (e.g. Havlena and Holbrook 1986; Srinivasan 1987) , as well as the distinction between hedonic and instrumental components of attitudes (e.g. Batra and Ahtola 1990).
In particular, it has been shown that consumers are more likely to rely on experiential decision strategies (such as the recruitment of anticipatory feelings through imagery) when they have consummatory motives (Pham 1998) . On the other hand, consumers are more likely to rely on reason-based strategies (e.g., the comparison of pros and cons) when they have instrumental motives. To the extent that the above-mentioned strategies map onto the processes captured by the SSTS scales (which may or may not be true), an important determinant of a consumer's situational thinking approach would be the consumer's underlying motive for performing the task, independent of the task itself. 2 Thus:
H5: Consumers with consummatory (instrumental) motives will have higher rational (experiential) SSTS scores than consumers with instrumental (consummatory) motives.
Promotion vs. Prevention Focus.
In the regulatory focus literature, a promotion focus is characterized by an emphasis on ideals, reflecting an individual's hopes, wishes and aspirations, while a prevention focus is characterized by an emphasis on oughts, reflecting an individual's duties, obligations and responsibilities (e.g. Higgins, 2000) . Based upon the face value of these characterizations, a promotion focus appears to be well suited to experiential thinking, while a prevention focus appears to be suited to rational thinking. In persuasion settings, it has been
shown that consumers with a promotion focus (e.g. Higgins 1998) are more likely to rely on affective cues than consumers with a prevention focus. Consumers with a prevention focus are more likely to rely on substantive and factual information than consumers with a promotion focus (Pham and Avnet, 2004) . To the extent that the reliance on affect versus substance maps onto the processes captured by the SSTS scales, consumers' situational thinking approaches also depend on their self-regulatory orientation, independent of the task itself. Thus:
H6: Consumers with a prevention (promotion) focus will have higher rational (experiential) SSTS scores than consumers with an experiential (rational) focus.
STUDY 1: SCALE DEVELOPMENT Method
Sample and Measures. A total of 602 respondents in study 1 comprised the calibration sample for developing the SSTS. Study 1 was programmed and administered via an academic Web-based online research facility, with 2400 respondents randomly selected from an online panel. Up to three email notifications over a one week period were used to solicit cooperation for a Web-based experiment, and a $500 prize drawing served as an incentive. Of the 2400 invitations, 655 respondents (27%) completed study 1. We eliminated 37 respondents who spent less than 5 minutes or more than one hour on the full study, as well as additional 16 outliers with extremely low or high times spent on one of the five individual tasks, producing an analysis sample size of 602 respondents 3 .
Respondents were randomly assigned to one of five experimental tasks in a betweensubjects design. Prior to completing one of the five experimental tasks, respondents completed a brief set of four warm up questions dealing with general Internet use. Following the experimental task, respondents completed 53 SSTS items (five point rating scales), followed by the six-item NASA TLX rating scale of subjective workload assessment (seven point rating scales) (NASA Human Performance Research Group 1987). As a summed scale comprised of items measuring mental demand, physical demand, temporal demand, performance, effort, and frustration, TLX provides a broadly-based measure of workload that has been extensively used in evaluating human-computer interaction.
Experimental Tasks. The five experimental tasks used in study 1 were chosen based upon the extent that experiential or rational processing would be most appropriate for successfully completing the task. As a nonverbal test of abstract reasoning, Raven's Standard Progressive
Matrices (Raven 1976 ) was expected to favor rational processing, and respondents in Raven's condition completed 11 problems from one of the more difficult sections of the Raven's test.
Each problem consisted of a three-by-three grid of geometric patterns, with one item in the grid missing. Respondents were asked to select the correct missing piece from a set of eight alternatives. The geometric patterns increased in difficulty as the respondent moved through the task. In a second rational task, respondents were given five specific factual questions about films that could be answered by searching the Internet Movie Database (IMDB).
The "Product Improvement Task" from the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (Torrance 1990 ) was expected to favor experiential processing; respondents were shown a picture of a stuffed toy elephant, and asked to "list the most clever, interesting, and unusual ways you can think of for changing this toy elephant so that children will have more fun playing with it." Respondents were allowed to list up to 20 different modifications, but were asked to try and come up with at least five. In a similar experiential task, respondents were asked to browse the IMDB and provide up to 20 "clever, interesting, and unusual ways you can think of for modifying the IMDB Web site so that people like you will have more fun browsing through it."
Finally, in a third experiential task, respondents were simply asked to "browse at your own pace"
and "just have fun as you look around" the IMDB site.
SSTS Item Construction.
Drawing from the 13 characteristics differentiating experiential and rational processing shown in table 1, we constructed 28 experiential and 25 rational items that spanned these 13 characteristics, worded as self-report, post-task measures of situationspecific thinking style (SSTS). Of the 53 items, 15 items were modified from the 40-item Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI), a measure of dispositional thinking style (Pacini and Epstein 1999) , and reworded to be suitable as situation-specific ratings. Many of the REI items tap very similar constructs, with redundancy in wording. The 20 item REI experiential scale, for example, includes seven items including either the word "intuition" or "intuitive," and seven items including either "gut feelings" or "feelings". Thus our remaining 38 items employed an expanded vocabulary to maximize coverage of the 13 characteristics in table 1.
Results
Using the full set of 53 SSTS items, coefficient alpha was .864 for the 28 experiential items, and .884 for the 25 rational items. However, a principal components analysis of the combined set of 53 rational and experiential items revealed 10 factors with eigenvalues greater than one, indicating a highly multidimensional structure, complicated by a few rational and experiential items crossloading on the same factors. We sequentially eliminated 21 experiential and rational items with a corrected item-total correlation less than .4, reducing the experiential item set from 28 to 14 items, and the rational from 25 to 18 items, and then sequentially dropped items that minimized the decrease in coefficient alpha for the rational and experiential item sets, producing final item sets of 10 rational and 10 experiential items. We note that identical 10 item subsets were obtained by the alternate procedure of selecting 10 items with the largest factor loadings on the first two unrotated factors from a five factor solution (after eliminating the 21 items with low item-total correlations). These final 10 item scales are indicated in the first two columns of table 2, along with factor pattern loadings from an oblique promax rotation (only two factors had eigenvalues greater than one, and the two factors explained 52.6% of variance).
Coefficient alphas for the 10-item summed scales were .887 for the 10 experiential items and .900 for the 10 rational items. The 10 item summed scales for experiential and rational SSTS correlated -.102 in the calibration sample.
----Insert table 2 about here ----For each of the five study 1 tasks, table 3 reports means on the SSTS scales, NASA TLX summed scale, and time spent on each task. Significant differences were found on all of these measures, with the pattern of rational and experiential SSTS means consistent with our a priori characterization of the five tasks as either primarily rational or experiential. Table 3 also reports means and standard deviations for task performance. For the Ravens task and the IMBD directed search tasks, performance was measured as the number of items correctly answered. Performance on the elephant product improvement task was the sum of codes for fluency, originality, and flexibility (Torrance 1990) . Fluency is the total number of relevant ideas expressed, originality the number of total responses excluding those characterized as having "zerooriginality," and flexibility the number of non-redundant broader general approaches. As scoring procedures for originality and flexibility were not available for the IMDB improvement task, only fluency was scored for the IMDB tasks. Note that there is no objective measure of task performance for the task of non-directed browsing of the IMDB.
----Insert it is possible to measure performance, experiential SSTS significantly correlates with task performance, while rational SSTS is uncorrelated with performance.
----Insert table 4 about here ----
STUDY 2: VALIDATION Method
Sample and Measures. Of 1100 randomly selected respondents, 335 (30%) completed study 2. The same set and sequence of measures used in study 1 was also used in study 2, as was the same procedure of emailing invitations to respondents from an online panel for a Web-based study. Eliminating 16 outlier respondents who had extremely low or extremely high times on the full study and/or the experimental task produced an analysis sample size of 319 respondents, which served as the validation sample for the 10-item experiential and rational SSTS scales developed in study 1. This uneven split with more respondents in the calibration sample is recommended (Wickens 1989) .
Experimental Tasks. Six experimental tasks in a between-subjects design were used in study 2, as summarized in table 5. The two tasks with the largest differences between mean SSTS score were retained from study 1 and four new tasks were added to increase the generalizability of the validation. Four tasks were expected to elicit rational processing. Two rational tasks employed Raven's Matrices; one task used the same higher difficulty problems as in study 1, and a second Raven's task included only six lower difficulty problems. Verbal analogies were used in the other two rational conditions. For each of ten pairs of words, respondents were asked to identify an answer pair from a list of five pairs that "best expresses a relationship similar to that expressed in the original pair." The ten pairs were either at a low or high degree of difficulty, using pre-established items and difficulty ratings (College Board 2003).
The toy elephant "Product Improvement Task" from study 1 was used as one experiential condition. The "Alternate Uses Task" was used as the second experiential condition to measure ideational fluency (Torrance 1990 ). In the Alternate Uses Task, respondents were asked "to list as many different uses for a common brick as you can think of."
Results
Coefficient alpha in the study 2 validation sample for the ten-item experiential SSTS scale was .904. For the 10-item rational SSTS scale, coefficient alpha was .916 in the validation sample. The 10 item scales for experiential and rational SSTS correlated -.292 in the validation sample. The third and fourth columns in table 2 reports factor pattern loadings from an oblique promax rotation (only two factors had eigenvalues greater than one) 4 . A two-factor confirmatory factor analysis model was fit to the 319 respondents in the validation sample, with 10 items loading on each of the experiential and rational factors. Fit of this structural model was acceptable with CFI=.93 and RMSEA=.07. These results provide good evidence of reliability and validity of the two-dimensional structure for experiential and rational situation-specific thinking style, and support hypotheses 1. Table 5 reports means on the SSTS scales, NASA TLX summed scale and the time spent on each task, as well as means and standard deviations for task performance. As in study 1, the rational (experiential) tasks had higher rational (experiential) SSTS scores than the experiential (rational) tasks, again providing evidence of internal validity of the scales. Task performance for the Raven's Progressive Matrices tasks and verbal analogies was measured as the number of items correctly answered. The elephant product improvement task was again coded for fluency, originality, and flexibility (Torrance 1990) . As scoring procedures for originality and flexibility
were not available for the alternative uses task, only fluency was scored.
----Insert for all four rational tasks, rational SSTS significantly correlates with task performance. As hypothesized, for three of these four rational tasks, experiential SSTS negatively correlates with task performance, and for the other task is not significantly correlated. Support for hypothesis 2 is, however, not provided for the two experiential tasks. While in study 1, experiential SSTS correlated with performance on the two experiential tasks, in study 2, correlations of experiential and rational SSTS with performance were not significant for either experiential task.
----Insert table 6 about here ----
STUDY 3: FIT AND MEDIATION

Method
Sample and Experimental Tasks. Study 3 was administered via an academic Web-based facility as in studies 1 and 2, with a cooperation rate of 31% (399 completes from 1300 randomly selected respondents). Respondents were asked to complete either the Raven's Progressive Matrices (11 items) task or the elephant Product Improvement task. These two tasks were selected because they exhibited the largest separation in mean rational and experiential SSTS scores in studies 1 and 2. Eliminating 26 respondents who spent less than 5 minutes or more than 60 minutes on the study produced an analysis sample size of 373, with 193 respondents completing the rational Raven's task, and 180 the experiential Product Improvement task.
Measures. Measures were collected in the following sequence. First, prior to completing the experimental task, dispositional thinking style was assessed using Norris and Epstein's (2003b) REI-24 scale. Respondents' mood prior to the experimental task was next measured using Allen and Janiszewski's (1989) four item scale. The Raven's or Product Improvement task was then presented, after which mood was again assessed, followed by the 10-item rational and experiential SSTS scales validated in studies 1 and 2. This was followed by Shiv and Fedorikhin's (1999) unidimensional five-item "Heart vs. Mind" scale (scaled so a higher summed score corresponded to rational thinking, and a lower score to experiential thinking). The following measures were then obtained, in this sequence: perceived task performance (using new items we developed 5 ); task difficulty (four-item scale from Keller Anand and McGill 1994); subjective workload assessment using the six-item NASA TLX (NASA Human Performance
Research Group 1987); and task involvement (four-item scale from Pham 1996) . As before, objective task performance was measured as the number of the 11 Raven's Progressive Matrices items the respondent correctly identified, and the sum of coded values of the Product Improvement task on flexibility, originality, and fluency (Torrance 1990 ).
Results
Measurement.
Reliabilities for all summed scales were greater than .7 (see table 7), with the exception of the NASA TLX scale (alpha=.681) and the REI Rational Ability subscale (alpha=.669) which had marginal alphas. The mean rational SSTS for the rational task (M=40.4) was significantly higher (p<.001) than mean rational SSTS for the experiential task (M=30.4), and mean experiential SSTS for the rational task (M=31.8) was significantly lower (p<.001) than mean experiential SSTS for the experiential task (M=38.7), providing additional support for internal validity of the SSTS.
----Insert Seven of 12 correlations of SSTS scores with the three subjective measures are consistent with hypothesis 3, four are non-significant, and one correlation is opposite that predicted by hypothesis 3, in that rational SSTS significantly correlates with perceived performance on the experiential task 6 .
----Insert table 8 about here ----Regression Models. Table 9 presents results of a set of regression models predicting task performance from the REI and SSTS scales, for both the rational and experiential task. First consider models 2 and 3 which show that: 1) rational SSTS is positively related, and experiential SSTS is negatively related, to rational task performance; and 2) experiential SSTS is positively related, and rational SSTS is negatively related, to experiential task performance. These results support hypothesis 2. Further, model 1 shows that rational REI significantly predicts rational task performance when SSTS is not included in the model, but model 2 shows that this effect is completely mediated by rational SSTS, supporting hypothesis 4. Considering the experiential task, experiential REI does not significantly predict experiential task performance in model 1, so the question of mediation is not relevant for the experiential task 7 .
----Insert table 9 about here ----
Structural Models. We systematically tested for congruence and incongruence effects in a broader context by considering the impact of dispositional and situation-specific thinking style on task performance, taking into account mood measured before and after task completion, 6 A supplemental analysis compared the two SSTS scales with Shiv and Fedorikhin's (1999) Heart vs. Mind scale, in predicting actual and perceived task performance for the rational and experiential tasks. For the rational task, the two SSTS scales significantly (p<.05) predicted actual performance (R 2 = .194) and perceived performance (R 2 = .368). The Heart vs. Mind scale also significantly predicted actual performance (R 2 = .142) and perceived performance (R 2 = .172). However, for the experiential task, while the two SSTS scales significantly predicted actual performance (R 2 = .085) and perceived performance (R 2 = .225), the Heart vs. Mind scale predicted neither actual performance (R 2 = .000, p=.604) nor perceived performance (R 2 = .001, p=.337).
7 Note that when predicting experiential task performance, including rational and experiential REI in model 2 increases both the absolute value and statistical significance of the standardized regression coefficients for rational and experiential SSTS, as compared to Model 3. Further, the signs of coefficients for rational and experiential REI in model 2 are opposite those of coefficients for rational and experiential SSTS. These results suggest that in model 2, rational and experiential REI serve as suppressor variables when predicting actual task performance on the experiential task (Maasen and Bakker 2001). perceived task difficulty, task involvement, and task time. Mood prior to task completion and dispositional thinking style were treated as exogenous. Dispositional thinking was measured by the two REI-24 subscales for rational/experiential ability (extent to which the respondent believes they successfully employ a thinking style) and the two REI-24 subscales for favorability (extent to which the respondent believes a thinking style should be used). Task time, perceived task difficulty, task involvement, and mood following task initiation are included as mediators of SSTS in predicting task performance. Based upon the results of table 7 and hypothesis 4, the role of dispositional thinking in predicting task performance is completely mediated by SSTS. The more positive the pre-task mood, the more a rational SSTS was adopted for the rational task and the more an experiential SSTS was adopted for the experiential task (see General Discussion section). As shown in figures 1a and 1b, pretask mood also positively impacts post-task mood, which in turn increases task involvement and decreases task difficulty. Task involvement and task difficulty both increase task time. These results appear for both the rational and experiential tasks.
----Insert figure 1a and 1b about here ----For the rational task (figure 1a), there is a strong congruence effect across multiple constructs. Rational SSTS improves post-task mood, increases task involvement, decreases perceived task difficulty, and increases task performance. Rational SSTS during the rational task impacts task performance both directly and in a mediated manner through mood, involvement, and task difficulty. Experiential SSTS, which is incongruent with the demands of the task, has a negative direct relationship with task performance for the rational task, detracting from performance on the rational task.
For the experiential task (figure 1b), the pattern is reversed, the only anomaly being a positive relationship between rational SSTS during the experiential task and task involvement.
Otherwise, experiential SSTS (congruent with the task) improves post-task mood, increases task involvement, decreases perceived task difficulty and increases task performance, while rational SSTS (incongruent with the task) decreases task performance. The results show that rational and experiential thinkers are in their elements when performing rational and experiential tasks, respectively, and offer comprehensive support for hypothesis 4.
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STUDY 4: CONSUMMATORY AND INSTRUMENTAL MOTIVES Method
Study 4 was administered via an academic Web-based facility, with a cooperation rate of 20% (409 completes from 2050 randomly selected respondents). Eliminating 25 respondents 9 Structural models were also fit to REI total rational and REI total experiential scales (in place of the ability and engagement subscales), with similar results. In addition, as we noted the presence of suppressor effects of the REI scales, structural models were also fit for the experiential task including paths for suppressor effects from REI Rational Task Performance (.110), and from REI Experiential Task Performance (-.190) increases CFI to .989 and decreases RMSEA to .038. As expected, the path coefficient from SSTS Rational Task Performance increases to -.22, and the path coefficient from SSTS Experiential Task Performance increases to .26. who spent less than 5 minutes or more than 45 minutes on the study produced an analysis sample size of 384. After completing the experimental task described below, respondents completed the 20 SSTS items.
There were two experimental conditions in a between subject design. In the consummatory condition (n=187), subjects were told, "we are interested in your ideas of how the online shopping experience can be made more fun for people and better help them enjoy themselves while shopping." Subjects were asked to "provide any specific ideas you may have about how online shopping can be made more fun and engaging," were encouraged to expand on their ideas in any way they wanted, and to take as much time as needed. In the instrumental condition (n=197), subjects were told, "we are interested in your ideas of how the online shopping process can be made more useful for people and better help them achieve their shopping goals." Subjects were asked to "provide any specific ideas you may have about how online shopping can be made more useful and functional," and were encouraged to expand on their ideas and take as much time as needed.
Results
The mean experiential SSTS for the consummatory condition was significantly higher than the mean experiential SSTS for the instrumental condition (3.83 vs. 3.55), (F(1,382) = 15.51, p<.001). Additionally, the mean rational SSTS for the instrumental condition was significantly higher than the mean rational SSTS for the consummatory condition (3.70 vs. 3.41), (F(1,382) = 17.82, p<.001). These results support hypothesis 5, and provide evidence of external validity of the SSTS scales. We note that the effect size of the mean differences is small-to-moderate (Cohen, 1988) : eta-squared for differences in experiential SSTS was .039, while eta-square for differences in rational SSTS was .045.
STUDY 5: REGULATORY FOCUS Method
Study 5 was administered via an academic Web-based facility, with a cooperation rate of 31% (231 completes from 750 randomly selected respondents). Eliminating 28 respondents who spent less than 30 seconds or more than 400 seconds on the experimental task produced an analysis sample size of 203. After completing the experimental task described below, respondents completed the 20 SSTS items.
There were two experimental conditions in a between-subject design. The conditions were taken from Phan and Avnet's (2004) experimental conditions for promotion vs. prevention focus. In the promotion focus (ideals) condition (n=101), subjects were told, "this study is about how people's hopes and goals evolve over time." Subjects were asked to think about their "hopes and goals", and to write down at least two hopes and goals they had in the past, as well as two they have today. In the prevention focus (oughts) condition (n=102), subjects were told, "this study is about how people's sense of duty and obligations evolve over time." Subjects were asked to think about their "duties and obligations," and two write down at least two duties and obligations they had in the past, as well as two they have today.
Results
The mean experiential SSTS for the promotion focus (ideals) condition was significantly higher than the mean experiential SSTS for the prevention focus (oughts) condition (3.80 vs.
3.60), (F(1,201) = 5.61, p=.019). Additionally, the mean rational SSTS for the prevention focus (oughts) condition was significantly higher than the mean rational SSTS for the promotion focus (ideals) condition (3.76 vs. 3.49), (F(1,201) = 7.50, p=.006). These results support hypothesis 6, and provide evidence of external validity of the SSTS scales. We note that the effect size of the mean differences is small-to-moderate (Cohen 1988) : eta-squared for differences in experiential SSTS was .027, while eta-square for differences in rational SSTS was .036.
DISCUSSION
We developed and cross-validated new scales measuring experiential and rational situation-specific thinking style (SSTS) using a series of experimental tasks designed to induce primarily rational or experiential thinking. Our highly reliable SSTS measure was, as predicted, best fit by a two-dimensional factor structure. Evidence of internal validity was provided in that rational SSTS was higher for rational tasks and experiential SSTS was higher for experiential tasks. Further, the fit (congruence) of SSTS with task improved task performance, while lack of fit worsened task performance; thus SSTS is an important process variable in understanding task performance. Fit effects were also found for subjective measures of perceived performance, task difficulty and subjective workload. As evidence of external validity, SSTS was found to be influenced by motivation (consummatory vs. instrumental) as well as regulatory focus (promotion vs. prevention).
Both the task itself, as well as dispositional tendencies to adopt a particular thinking style, predict SSTS. Since dispositional tendencies predict SSTS, disposition influences the degree to which a priming task is likely to be effective, and thus disposition should be measured as a covariate when attempting to prime thinking style. However, we did find that the role of dispositional tendencies in predicting objective performance as well as subjective outcomes was completely mediated by SSTS.
Besides disposition, task demands, and motivation, there are likely many other factors that influence SSTS. For example, ability, in the form of task-relevant background knowledge or expertise, may influence whether rational or experiential thinking is employed in the service of a specific task. Novices tend to use rational thinking to construct a solution, whereas experts are more likely to rely on experiential thinking, drawing upon their extensive body of experience to recognize patterns and similarities in an intuitive manner (Alba and Hutchinson 1987; Ericsson and Lehmann 1996; Hogarth 2005) .
Individuals in a happy mood have been found to have superior performance on creative tasks (Isen 1987; Isen et al. 1985; Schwarz and Clor 1996) . Figure 1b shows that this result for mood may be explained by the mediating role of experiential SSTS for the experiential task.
Prior research has also shown that consumers in an unhappy mood are more likely to engage in systematic (rational) processing, while those in a happy mood are more likely to engage in heuristic (experiential) processing (Bless and Schwarz 1999; Bless et. al 1990; Forgas 2001; Schwarz and Bless 1991) . Our results expand these findings: we observed that positive pre-task mood leads respondents to adopt a thinking style congruent to the task. It may be that adopting an inappropriate (inconsistent with task) thinking style puts individuals in a worse mood. Our congruence finding also extends the affect-confirmation process result in which mood can influence evaluations, for example, by causing subjects to give more weight to information congruent with their manipulated mood (Adaval 2001) . In our case, a positive affective state motivates respondents to adopt a thinking style congruent with the task.
In addressing the discrepancy between our congruence results for mood and thinking style and previous research that finds happy mood induces experiential processing while unhappy mood induces rational processing, we note from table 7 that our respondents' reported mood was, on average, relatively high both pre-and post-task. Thus, the distinction in our case is actually between individuals in a "good vs. better" mood, rather than a "bad vs. good" mood.
An interesting question for future research concerns the boundary conditions of our congruence findings under mood manipulations: will congruence and incongruence effects hold under truly negative affective states?
While our experimental tasks indicated largely oppositional effects of the two styles, it is likely that other tasks might demonstrate synergistic effects, with both experiential and rational SSTS correlating positively with task performance. For example, Donovan and Epstein (1997) demonstrated that priming intuitive knowledge can facilitate intellectual performance, and Norris and Epstein (2003a) demonstrated numerous situations in which both thinking styles predict in the same direction.
In terms of future empirical work, we note that in Tables 4 and 6, hypothesized correlations of rational and experiential SSTS with task performance are stronger for the rational tasks than for the experiential tasks. Additionally, the correlations supporting H3 in Table 8 Recently, cognitive neuropsychologists have utilized brain imaging tools such as fMRI to support the presence in the brain of dual thinking styles (Goel 2003; Goel and Dolan 2003) .
McClure et al, for example, found "the discrepancy between short-run and long-run preferences reflects the differential activation of distinguishable neural systems" (2004, p. 504) . Further, biochemical theories of emotion speculate that "gut reactions," for example, may literally reside in one's stomach (Pert 1997) . Our empirical results demonstrating the importance of situationspecific thinking style over and above dispositional thinking style for task performance may provide further impetus to scientists seeking neurological and chemical pathways that correspond to human cognition and task performance. Note: SSTS items were measured using five-point scales; NASA TLX items were measured using seven-point rating scales, with higher TLX scores indicating greater subjective workload.
Note: Tukey post-hoc tests are summarized with underscores. Means with a solid underline are significantly different from means with a dotted underline. Within solid and dotted underline groups, means are not significantly different. a Performance measures: Verbal analogies and Raven's use number correct; elephant product improvement tasks use sum of coded counts for fluency, originality, and flexibility; alternate uses of a brick task uses fluency (number of uses suggested).
Note: SSTS items were measured using five-point scales; NASA TLX items were measured using seven-point rating scales, with higher TLX scores indicating greater subjective workload.
Note: Tukey post-hoc tests are summarized with underscores. Means with a solid underline are significantly different from means with a dotted underline. Within solid and dotted underline groups, means are not significantly different. 
